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Abstract  
 The mix between monetary and fiscal policy actions are of vital importance on 
economic outcomes. The present paper integrates monetary and budgetary shock into a 
Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model of Romanian economy. The policy mix, as 
well as the impact of the two policies on output gap and inflation is analyzed by means of 
both contemporaneous and long term identification schemes. The results over the 2000-2014 
period, although generally in line with economic theory, provide no clear evidence on the 
strategic interaction (substituent or complementary instruments) between the monetary and 
public authorities. However, Granger causality and variance decomposition point to a 
relatively higher importance of monetary shocks in the economy.  
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Introduction  
and literature review  
 In every country, an efficient economic management depends on the understanding of 
shocks propagating within the economy and the interaction among them. Monetary and fiscal 
policy shocks interaction arises by multiple channels: monetary policy influences the 
budgetary one through seigniorage, inflation has effects on real public debt, fiscal discipline 
can affect monetary authorities’ credibility, while fiscal policy and unexpected inflation have 
impact on employment, a major objective of the policy mix. 
 Both policies can and should be used for preventing extreme economic fluctuations 
(Sprinkel, 1963). At the same time, formulating compatible objectives of the two parties, 
efficient exchange of information and sustainable behavior are essential factors for assuring 
social welfare.   
 The scope of the present paper is the empirical analysis of the links intervened 
between monetary and fiscal policy, with an empirical application for one of the most 
important Central Eastern European country (Romania). 
 The literature focused on fiscal-monetary policy mix can be divided in four main 
streams: i) fiscal theory of the price level, ii) strategic interactions between fiscal and 
monetary policies, iii) empirical studies and iv) monetary and fiscal mix within an open 
economy. 
 Fiscal theory of the price level was developed by Leeper (1991), Sims (1994, 1997, 
2001) and Woodford (1994), focusing on non-Ricardian fiscal policy. 
 The stream of literature related to strategic interactions between fiscal and monetary 
policies is mainly centered on game theory developed by Nash (during 1950-1953). In this 
theory, it is reached a type of uncooperative equilibrium, with unfavorable effects on general 
wellbeing. Dixit and Lambertini (2000) highlight that divergent objectives of the two 
authorities would lead to inflation and GDP values far from the ones desired.  
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 Empirical literature aims at identifying how the two policies really behave. Mélitz 
(2000), using data for 19 OECD countries for 1960-1995, show that the two policies tend to 
move in opposite direction, thus being strategic substituents. Similar conclusions were found 
by Wyplosz (1999) or von Hagen (2001) for 20 OECD member states during 1973-1989.  
 In the last wave of studies, the correlation between fiscal and monetary policies in two 
or more countries is the main interest of studies (Van Aarle, 2003; Sims, 1997; Beetsma and 
Jensen, 2002). An important area of research is represented by Monetary and Economic 
Union countries, since Euro Area Member States have their own fiscal authorities, while 
monetary policy is realized by Central European Bank. The principal pillars of monetary-
fiscal game are represented by Maastricht Treaty and Stability and Growth Pact.  
 
Methodological framework for assessing the  
interactions between monetary and fiscal policies 
 The present paper analyses the macroeconomic effects of fiscal and monetary policy, 
as well as their interaction, in case of Romania, through applying a Structural Vector 
Autoregression (SVAR) model. This is a natural choice, as macroeconomic phenomena are 
characterized by feedback and reciprocal causality.  
 Introduced by Sims (1980), SVAR models have been used in analyzing the monetary 
policy, more specifically in studying the propagation mechanism of real and nominal 
monetary shocks. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) were the pioneers of introducing the fiscal 
variables (taxes and public expenses) in SVAR framework, while Favero (2002) showed that 
a separate estimation of monetary and fiscal policies effects would lead to biased estimators. 
 These models express a set of observable variables by their own lags and other factors 
(trend/constant). SVARs have also been used for studying money effect on GDP (Sims and 
Zha, 2005), demand and supply shocks importance for economic cycle (Blanchard and Quah, 
1989) or the link between technologic shocks and worked hours (Gali, 1999). At the same 
time, these models are flexible, require only a minimum set of restrictions and offer 
extremely useful instruments: impulse response function (IRF), forecast error variance 
decomposition (FEVD) and Granger causality – comprehensively reflecting the size of 
impact and transmission mechanism of macroeconomic and policy shocks. These models 
isolate the answer of each variable to structural shocks and highlight their transmission in 
time. 
 Unrestricted VAR models are centered on investigating the shocks intervened in the 
analyzed variables. A shock or innovation represents the part of a variable that cannot be 
explained by its history or by other variables in the system. Thus, the shocks are residual 
terms in stochastic equation of the system. Starting from the system: 
 𝑋𝑡 =  𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝑌𝑡−1 + ε1𝑡  (1) 
 𝑌𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝑌𝑡−1 + ε2𝑡  (2) 
ε1𝑡 şi ε2𝑡  are the innovations intervened at moment t on X and Y, while the other terms in 
each equation reflect the deterministic part explained by system history. The main objective 
of VAR analysis is examining the effects of these innovations on interest variable. For the 
identification of the shocks, the most used solutions are: Choleski decomposition, structural 
decomposition (Sims-Bernake) and Blanchard-Quah long term restrictions decomposition. 
 Starting from the following system with n variables: 
 𝐴𝑥𝑡 =  𝐶(𝐿)𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑣𝑡  (3) 
where A represents a (𝑛𝑥𝑛) matrix of contemporaneous relations; 𝑥𝑡 is a (𝑛𝑥1) vector of 
macroeconomic variables, 𝐶(𝐿) lag matrix; 𝑣𝑡  innovations vector and B a (𝑛𝑥𝑛) diagonal (in 
most cases) matrix. Multiplying by 𝐴−1, we get: 
 𝑥𝑡 =  𝐴−1𝐶(𝐿)𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 (4) 
 where 𝑢𝑡  = 𝐴−1𝐵𝑣𝑡 (5) 
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 Equation (3) presents the structural, “real” model of the economy, which cannot be 
empirically observed. Only some variables in the eq. (4) can be observed, this equation 
representing the reduced form of the model, in which 𝑢𝑡 are liniar combinations of structural 
shocks 𝑣𝑡, taking into account eq. (5). From here, the problem of identification of structural 
innovations emerges. 
 While a monetary shock generally refers to an unexpected movement of interest rate, 
a fiscal shock can be due to two basic shocks: in fiscal incomes and government expenses. 
Other fiscal shocks (for example in budgetary deficit) can be considered as linear 
combination of basic shocks. In case of fiscal policy, one has to take into account the lag 
between the announcement and implementation of fiscal measures, the announcement itself 
being able to cause movement of macroeconomic variables, before the effective change in 
fiscal stance. 
 
Model estimation and results 
 This paper aims at estimating a SVAR with four variables: GDP (in logs), GDP 
deflator (in logs), money market 12 months interest rate and budgetary balance 
(deficit/surplus as percent of GDP) for identification of the influence of monetary and fiscal 
policies shocks. The model uses quarterly data for Q1/2000:Q2/2014 and was implemented in 
EViews and JMulti.  
 We followed the normal steps when dealing with macroeconomic time series: 
seasonal adjustment (using Tramo/Seats method for correcting outliers and eliminating 
special effects as “Trading Day”, “Easter” etc.) and stationarity testing. Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test (Dickey, Fuller, 1979) indicates that the series are not stationary and moreover, 
these have different integration orders (interest rate, GDP deflator and government deficit are 
I(1)1,while GDP is I(2)). For assuring an easier interpretation of the results, I applied 
Hodrick-Prescott (1980) filter (λ= 1600) as a method for obtaining stationary series: the used 
series represented the gaps of the initial variables compared to their trend.   
 The lag length criteria (Akaike, Schwartz and Hannan-Quinn), as well as the limited 
number of observations, leaded to an one-lag model, for assuring a larger number of degrees 
of freedom. The stability tests of the model indicated that the estimated system is not 
explosive, i.e. the shocks’ impact on variables diminishes until exhaustion after a certain 
period of time. Model’s stability is verified if all inverse roots of characteristic polynomial of 
estimated VAR coefficients are inside unit circle (Figure 12). 
 Normality, homoscedasticity and autocorrelation hypotheses (𝑢𝑡 are assumed to 
follow a white noise process) were also tested and generally confirmed for the estimated 
model. 
 The last stage of the models (identification of structural innovations) is made by 
imposing at least 𝑛(𝑛−1)
2
 0 restrictions on matrix A coefficients (eq. 3),  where n is the number 
of variables. 
 In case of B matrix, I use a diagonal form. I estimate an exactly identified system, 
imposing 4∗3
2
=6 restrictions, reflecting the causality/interdependence among variables, 
manifested during a quater. 
 Thus, the structure of contemporaneous relations is described in Table 1: the row 
variable is influenced, during the quarter, by column variables. The 1 on principal diagonal 
shows each variables is influenced by itself, the “NA” denote that the influence between 
variables exists, while the 0 restrictions show the lack of influence. 
                                                          
1 Meaning that the first difference of the variables is stationary.  
2 All tables and figures refer to Appendix. 
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 The abovementioned restrictions are generated by ordinary theoretical intuition on 
links between variables within three months: 
- The contemporaneous response of fiscal policy variable to an innovation in GDP, 
inflation rate and interest rate is set to 0, since, in general, more than three months are 
needed for the Government to approve and implement new measures and for the 
decision process to pass the legislative body (de Castro Fernández, de Cos, 2006; 
Krusec, 2003); 
- The contemporaneous response of output and inflation to an interest rate shock is 0 (in 
line with Leeper and Gordon, 1992; Leeper, Sims and Zha, 1996). If the central bank 
modifies the interest rate, this effect is first transmitted to money market, it influences 
the commercial banks’ reserves and their capacity of granting loans, thus propagating 
further in the economy. In general, this process takes more than three months. At the 
same time, on short run, the prices are sticky. 
- An inflationary shock (GDP deflator) doesn’t influence GDP level within the three 
months interval. 
 These restrictions are in line with well-known models (IS curve, Philips curve, Taylor 
rule etc.). 
 The next step in the econometric process is testing model’s coefficients stability for 
checking the Lucas (1976) critique (stipulating that econometric estimates are invalidated if 
these ignore regime changes during the analyzed period). For testing coefficient stability and 
whether during the period, structural changes have intervened, I applied CUSUM test, who 
also offers a graphical image. Brown et al. (1975) showed that if the tested indicators exit the 
critical margins, there is a solid base for doubting the structural stability of the estimated 
model. At it is shown in Figure 2, the estimated coefficients are stable, conclusion also 
confirmed by recursive parameters’ analysis. 
 Based on this model, the final results (IRF, FEVD and Granger causality) can be 
generated. 
  IRFs display the shocks effects in the system and their trajectory in time. IRF for 12 
quarters (3 years) are presented in Figure 3. On the first column, a shock in aggregate demand 
is analyzed (ε𝑡𝐼𝑆): the output gap increases, followed by an increase in prices’ level, which 
reaches the maximum level after one period. The aggregate demand increases more than the 
supply, causing inflation, the situation being one in which “too much money chasing too few 
things” (Frisch, 1983). In face of inflationary pressures, the central bank reacts by increasing 
interest rate, this variable thus following Taylor rule (being an increasing function in 
inflation). Due to the advance in interest rate and inflation, the fiscal deficit increases in the 
first two periods through interest payment to public debt. As the interest rate increases, 
inflation, output gap and public deficit reenter the normal trajectory to equilibrium levels. 
 On the second column, we present a shock in aggregate supply (ε𝑡𝐴𝑆): once the 
economy is hit by a supply shock, inflation is increasing, determining the central bank to 
increase the interest rate (but the results are not statistically significant). This causes, by the 
multiplier effect, a decline in GDP, which reaches the highest amplitude in the 5th quarter. 
Counterintuitively, the public deficit is decreasing until the 4th quarter. As a result of 
restrictive monetary policy, inflation rate and output gap declines, and after the central bank 
reduces the interest rate, the initial shock impact decreases till exhaustion.  
 In the third column, we show the responses of macroeconomic and fiscal policy 
variables to a shock in monetary policy ( ε𝑡𝑀𝑃).  As expected, at a positive shock in monetary 
policy, the output gap declines: investment (a part of GDP) reduces, loans are granted with 
difficulty, deposits are perceived to be more attractive and thus the aggregate demand 
diminishes. At the same time, restrictive monetary policy measures lead to inflation decline, 
evolution also determined by budget deficit contraction. After the objective of price stability 
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is accomplished, the central bank reduces interest rate, stimulating economic activity, 
recovery of output gap, inflation and deficit to equilibrium levels. 
 On the last column, the effects of a fiscal shock ( ε𝑡𝐹𝑃) are emphasized: once the fiscal 
deficit increases, the aggregate demand advances (as the deficit is a part of the demand) and 
thus the GDP (this result is consistent with the ones obtained Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). 
The impact on inflation rate and on interest rate is not significant, although one would expect 
an increase in interest rate. 
 Taking into account all the results, the evidence on monetary and fiscal policies is 
mixed: we cannot identify a clear and significant pattern of interaction between the two 
policies. 
 For assessing the relative importance of each shock in the effects’ hierarchy, we 
proceed to variance decomposition. Since shocks are unpredictable, any shock determines 
unanticipated variation (forecast errors) in the variables. Variance decomposition computes 
the share of this variation due to innovations in each variables. 
 In one year time, in the case of all analyzed variables, the biggest importance in their 
evolution is given by their past values: output gap 84 percent, inflation rate 77 percent, 
interest rate 75 percent and budget deficit 87 percent (Figure 4). After 12 quarters, the 
importance of monetary shocks increases for all variables, although it maintains below 10 
percent. Even though smaller, the influence of fiscal innovation in explaining the variation of 
the variables also increases during the period. 
 For an in-depth analysis of the link between variables, I employed Granger (1969) 
causality test for each pair of variables, the test indicating which variables can be used in 
forecasting the others. More specific, 𝑥𝑡 causes, in a Granger sense 𝑧𝑡 , if a forecast for 𝑧𝑡 
containing information about 𝑥𝑡 history is better than a forecast ignoring 𝑥𝑡.   
 The results indicate that at a threshold of 10 percent (Table 3): 
- Output gap influences in Granger sense the interest rate level (test p value: 0.07)  
- Interest rate causes in Granger sense the fiscal deficit (p value: 0.01), highlighting the 
importance of monetary shocks. 
 The method mentioned above highlights short term effects, but the imposed 
restrictions could be considered rather rigid, leading to insignificant coefficients from A and 
B matrix, as well as insignificant IRF. 
 Identification of structural shocks effects on the system variables can be also 
effectuated by imposing restrictions on long term, cumulated effects. 
 Blanchard and Quah (1989), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) and Shapiro and 
Watson (1988) introduced long term restrictions with a wide variety of applications 
(economic cycle, money supply shocks etc.). For example, Blanchard and Quah argue that 
demand shocks have no permanent effect on GDP, unlike supply shocks. Long term 
restrictions assume that, starting from neutrality condition on long run, one can also draw 
conclusions about short term dynamics, with the advantage that economic theory offers more 
information about long-term relationships (Van Aarle, 2003). 
 In the structural matrix of long term relationship, we start from the long term money 
neutrality as we set to 0 the answer of output to innovations in aggregate supply, monetary 
and fiscal policy. Dalsgaard and de Serres (2000) also impose restrictions that nominal 
shocks should not affect real variables. Long term money neutrality assumes that a 
permanent, unexpected change in money supply has permanent effects only on nominal 
variables, not affecting the equilibrium values for real variables. This hypothesis was tested 
in numerous studies, which proved its applicability (Tawadros, 2007; Bullard, 1999; Coe and 
Nason, 1999). Long term neutrality of fiscal deficit is supported by Ricardian equivalence, 
taking into account the economic agents’ expectations that a present tax reduction means, in 
fact, an increase in the future. 
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 Another long term restriction is that inflation doesn’t answer on long term to 
monetary shocks, as Lucas argued that there is no monetary policy that can permanently 
sustain output (or unemployment rate) above equilibrium levels and cannot control in long 
term inflation rate. 
 At the same time, Fischer (1976) underlines that if fiscal policy had significant short 
term effects, but no long term impact, than it would be the ideal stabilizing tool. Thus, we 
assumed that fiscal variable in the model doesn’t impact on long term monetary variable or 
price level. Friedman (1972) also states that fiscal policy shocks are surely temporary and 
most probably small. Nasir et al. (2010) assume an inexistent long term interaction between 
fiscal deficit and inflation rate, monetarist theory stating that the government cannot 
influence by itself the inflation rate. Thus, C matrix of long term relations, is defined as in 
Table 2.   
 The IRFs for each variable during 48 quarters (Figure 5) have, generally, correct signs 
and are in line with the results of SVAR with contemporaneous restriction. Of particular 
importance is the confirmation of long term money neutrality (as the effect of interest rate on 
GDP neutralizes after 15-20 quarters). On long run, an inflationary shock is followed by a 
tightening budgetary policy and the fiscal policy contracts as the monetary authority is 
restrictive.  
 Contrary to economic intuition, it is noticed that once the interest rate is increased, the 
inflation rate advanced until 12 quarter. This positive relation is however often met in 
empirical analyses and is known as “price puzzle”, since after a positive shock of interest 
rate, one would expect price level to decrease (Balke, Emery, 1994). An explanation for this 
phenomenon is proposed by Sims (1994), who argues that the central bank responds to 
inflationary pressures by increasing interest rate, but this measure is not enough to prevent 
inflation from raising. On long term, the response of inflation to a monetary shock is neutral. 
The effects of a shock in fiscal policy are not in general statistically significant.  
  
Concluding remarks 
 The monetary and fiscal policies’ mechanism of transmission is of high importance 
within the analysis of macroeconomic policy. This paper used a Structural Vector 
Autoregression model for assessing the impact of monetary and fiscal authorities’ actions in 
one of the most important CEE country (Romania) during 2000-2014. Beyond policies’ 
innovation, the models identified the effects of structural shocks in demand and supply on 
output, prices, interest rate and public deficit. There has been found mix evidence on the 
effects of monetary and fiscal policy. The data didn’t clearly show whether the two policies 
act as strategic substituents or as complementary instruments in achieving the objectives. 
Although some results are not statistically significant, overall, the models offer convincing 
explanations related to the economic variables’ evolution in the mentioned time frame.  
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Appendix 
Figure 1. Model stability 
 
 
Figure 2.Cusum test  
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Table 1. Structure of contemporaneous relations matrix 
 
GDP GDP deflator Int. rate Fiscal deficit 
GDP 1 0 0 NA 
GDP deflator NA 1 0 NA 
Int. rate NA NA 1 NA 
Fiscal deficit 0 0 0 1 
 
Table 2. Structure of long term relations matrix 
 
GDP GDP deflator Int. rate Fiscal deficit 
GDP NA 0 0 0 
GDP deflator NA NA 0 0 
Int. rate NA NA NA 0 
Fiscal deficit NA NA NA NA 
 
Figure 3. Impulse response functions. SVAR with contemporaneous restrictions 
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Figure 4. Variance decomposition. SVAR with contemporaneous restrictions  
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Table 3. Granger causality test 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Date: 01/02/15   Time: 10:35  
Sample: 2000Q1 2014Q2  
Included observations: 57  
    
    Dependent variable: HP_GDP  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    HP_DEFL  0.479351 1  0.4887 
HP_INT  2.353398 1  0.1250 
HP_DEFICIT  0.906629 1  0.3410 
    
    All  5.537494 3  0.1364 
    
    Dependent variable: HP_DEFL  
    
    HP_GDP  1.061806 1  0.3028 
HP_INT  0.704784 1  0.4012 
HP_DEFICIT  0.409794 1  0.5221 
    
    All  1.375780 3  0.7112 
    
    Dependent variable: HP_INT  
    
    HP_GDP  3.262991 1  0.0709 
HP_DEFL  2.040443 1  0.1532 
HP_DEFICIT  0.001642 1  0.9677 
    
    All  5.533278 3  0.1367 
    
Dependent variable: HP_DEFICIT  
    
    HP_GDP  0.178308 1  0.6728 
HP_DEFL  0.427567 1  0.5132 
HP_INT  7.665657 1  0.0056 
    
    All  8.517851 3  0.0364 
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Figure 5. Impulse response functions. SVAR with long-term (Blanchard and Quah) restrictions 
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